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STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY FOR INJURIES
CAUSED BY RECOMBINANT DNA BACTERIA
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade developments in molecular genet-
ics have turned the world toward a new scientific-industrial
revolution. Most of the excitement has been generated by the
development of a technique, known as recombinant DNA,
which makes it possible to transfer genetic information from
one organism into an unrelated one. Recombinant DNA tech-
niques can be used to make new bacteria capable of producing
many vital products, such as drugs, hormones, and industrial
chemicals. As a result of the seemingly endless commercial ap-
plications, the new technique has marked the birth of a multi-
million dollar industry.
The development of organisms in a laboratory apart from
the natural evolutionary processes, however, could pose seri-
ous threats to society. If an individual is injured by one of the
newly created bacteria, a legal remedy will need to be fash-
ioned. The existing doctrine of strict product liability may
provide the remedy. This comment will explore the underly-
ing policies and the conceptual framework of the strict liabil-
ity doctrine and discuss its application to the new recombi-
nant DNA industry.
A. Recombinant DNA Technology
Genetic information is transmitted between generations
by the long thread-like molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA),' the basic component of genes.2 DNA also specifies
© 1982 by Debra E. Dahl
1. Grobstein, The Recombinant DNA Debate, 237 SCIENTIFIc AM. 22, 22-23
(1977).
2. See Clark, Begley & Hager, The Miracles of Spliced Genes, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
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the protein-building properties of the cell.3 Recombinant
DNA techniques involve the use of certain enzymes to cleave
the DNA from one organism into segments.4 The resulting
segments of DNA are then recombined with the DNA of a
plasmid5 or a virus,6 known as a carrier or a vector, and the
recombinant DNA is reinserted into a different organism,
known as the host organism. 7 The most common host organ-
ism used by scientists is the bacterium, Escherichia coli (E.
coli), a natural inhabitant of the human intestinal tract.8
As the bacterial cell reproduces or divides, it will transmit
the foreign DNA along to the next generation.9 The cell and
its progeny will continue to reproduce until soon the re-
searcher has thousands of the hybrid bacteria.10 The new col-
ony of bacteria will produce the specific protein encoded in
the foreign DNA." Thus, recombinant DNA techniques make
possible the creation of tiny bacteria factories, capable of
churning out vast amounts of vital proteins, and other
products."
B. Benefits
Seemingly endless social benefits could be derived from
giving bacteria the ability to produce new proteins. Already
through the use of recombinant DNA techniques, E. coli bac-
17, 1980, at 63 [hereinafter cited as Clark].
3. Grobstein, supra note 1.
4. Id. See generally Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, 233 SCIENTIFIC AM. 24
(1975), for a more technical discussion of the recombinant DNA technique.
5. Grobstein, supra note 1, at 25. A plasmid is an independently replicating
smaller loop of DNA separate from the main chromosome of a bacterium. 43 Fed.
Reg. 33,123 (1978). See generally Novick, Plasmids, 243 SCIENTIFIC AM. 103 (1980).
6. Grobstein, supra note 1, at 25. A virus is an infectious cell capable of inject-
ing its DNA into the host cell. Id. at 26.
7. Id. at 24-25.
8. Richmond, Escherichia coli K-12 and Its Use for Genetic Engineering Pur-
poses, in RECOMBINANT MOLECULES: IMPACT ON SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 429 (R. Beers &
E. Bassett eds. 1977). E. coli is usually harmless, but "some virulent strains cause
diarrhea and a few may produce septicemia (a disorder caused by bacteria in the
blood) or meningitis in already weakened victims." Thomasson, Recombinant DNA:
The Uncertainties of Regulation, CURRENT, Mar./Apr: 1980, at 33.
9. Clark, supra note 2, at 63.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See generally Gilbert & Villa-Komaroff, Useful Proteins from Recombinant
Bacteria, 242 SCIENTIFIC AM. 74 (1980), for a technical discussion of producing pro-
teins from recombinant bacteria.
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teria have been given genes to produce human insulin, a drug
desperately needed by diabetics.'" Researchers have given E.
coli a gene enabling it to produce interferon, a natural virus
fighter used to treat shingles, hepatitis, and flu, and which is
presently being tested for the treatment of cancer." Scientists
have also been able to induce bacteria to produce the pitui-
tary gland's growth hormone which will be used to treat chil-
dren suffering from dwarfism. 15 Other researchers have suc-
cessfully used recombinant bacteria to produce beta
endorphins, powerful painkilling drugs made naturally in the
brain."'
Many other applications are envisioned by scientists.
They hope to use the recombinant DNA techniques to make
Factor VIII, the blood protein needed by hemophiliacs to pre-
vent bleeding, and to produce safer and more effective vac-
cines. 1 7 In addition to the bacteria's use in production of com-
plex proteins and hormones of therapeutic importance, the
bacteria are being used to improve conventional fermentation
processes for making products such as antibiotics.'8
Other researchers are using bacteria to convert ethylene
to ethylene glycol and ethylene oxide, chemicals widely used
for the production of plastics and other products in the chem-
ical industry. 19 Another project involves the use of bacteria to
ferment biomass-plant waste products and noncrop plants
13. Clark, supra note 2, at 64. Insulin is presently extracted from pigs or cattle
and often contains impurities. The human insulin made by bacteria will be a safer
and cheaper alternative. Id. The human insulin which is closest to commercial manu-
facture is estimated to be marketed by the year 1984. New Life Forms: A Clear Road
Ahead, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 30, 1980, at 35 [hereinafter cited as New
Life Forms]. It is presently being clinically tested in London by Eli Lilly and Co. The
Potential of Gene Splicing, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 10, 1980, at 89 (hereinafter cited as The
Potential of Gene Splicing].
14. Clark, supra note 2, at 64; New Life Forms, supra note 13, at 35. Human
interferon is presently available only in small quantities and is very expensive be-
cause it is extracted from human white blood cells. A single treatment can cost as
much as $50,000. Id.
15. New Life Forms, supra note 13, at 35. Supplies now come from pituitary
glands of cadavers, and fifty to eighty cadavers are needed to provide a single year's
dose. Id.
16. Id.
17. Clark, supra note 2, at 64; Wade, Recombinant DNA: Warming Up for the
Big Payoff, 206 SCIENCE 663 (1979). See also Schmeck, Toward a New Scientific In-
dustrial Revolution, CURRENT, Mar./Apr. 1980, at 40, 43-44.
18. Schmeck, supra note 17, at 43-44.
19. Id.
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-and grain into ethyl alcohol which will be used by the en-
ergy industry to make gasohol, an energy supply that stretch-
es gasoline use."0 Recombinant DNA technology is even pre-
dicted to have an impact on the mining and agricultural
industries."1 In the more distant future the technique may be
used to manipulate and repair defective human genes.22
C. Hazards
With any new and beneficial technology, there are attend-
ant risks and hazards. In recombinant DNA technology, the
first cause for concern is that the chosen host for most recom-
binant DNA molecules, E. coli, is a common inhabitant of the
human intestinal tract.28 If the hybrid bacteria were to escape
from the laboratory via a laboratory worker or other channels,
they could pose a great danger to human populations by colo-
nizing in their intestines.2 4 In the intestine, the bacteria could
20. Id.
21. Id. at 42-43.
Agriculture is a target for the new biological techniques in several possi-
ble ways: genetic manipulations to increase the efficiency of photosyn-
thesis to get bigger crop yields. . . ; changes in the husks of grain plants
to make them more resistant to cold or drought, thus increasing geo-
graphical range; modifying major crop plants to give them the ability to
fix nitrogen, in effect giving them the potential for producing some of
their own fertilizer.
Id. at 42.
Even mining. . . may feel the impact of biology, according to some spe-
cialists. Some species of bacteria live on metallic ores, oxidizing them so
that they become soluble and the metals become easier to extract.
Manipulating the genetics of such microbes might improve their natural
talents sufficiently to have real economic and industrial impact.
Id. at 43.
22. New Life Forms, supra note 13, at 35. Scientists are presently conducting
experiments on animals involving the reinsertion of genetically repaired cells into the
body. Id. But cf Kolata & Wade, Human Gene Treatment Stirs New Debate, 210
SCIENCE 407 (1980). Researchers at the University of California at Los Angeles
treated two patients, one in Italy and the other in Israel, for beta-zero thalassemia, a
disease caused by a lack of a protein molecule that forms the beta-chain of hemoglo-
bin. The researchers were forbidden to practice the technique on human subjects in
the United States. The therapy involves removing a bone marrow cell from the pa-
tient, inserting the human gene for beta-hemoglobin and a gene that gives the new
cell a selective advantage over the defective bone marrow cells, and then injecting the
repaired cell back into the patient's body. The new cell should reproduce and give the
patient useful quantities of normal hemoglobin. Id.
23. Loechler, McLellan, Park, Shore, Thacher & Vouderian, Social and Politi-
cal Issues in Genetic Engineering, in GENETIc ENGINEERING 169 (Chakrabarty ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as Loechler].
24. Lederberg, The Least Hazardous Course: Recombinant DNA Technology
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possibly produce the proteins of hormones they were designed
to produce, and the presence of such unneeded substances in
the intestine might be fatal.2"
Problems may also arise if, along with the beneficial gene
coded to produce a certain protein, a gene with an unknown
or repressed function is introduced which causes the bacteria
to become pathogenic or to produce a fatal toxin as yet un-
known to man.2 The chance of an unknown adverse effect is
more likely when scientists perform "shotgun experiments.
27
Another possible consequence is that, rather than the
original host escaping and surviving outside the laboratory,
the vector or carrier may be transferred to a wild host.2 8 If the
original host had somehow acquired a pathogenic trait from
the foreign DNA, it could be passed onto wild strains of E.
coli. Since the bacteria are not the natural products of the
evolutionary process, humans or other living things may not
yet have developed adequate defenses against the new patho-
gen. Perhaps the newly created pathogen Would affect only
small numbers of the more susceptible individuals. On the
other hand, the result could reach epidemic proportions.
as an Option for Human Genetic, Viral, and Cancer Therapy, in RECOMBINANT MOL-
ECULES: IMPACT ON SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 488 (R. Beers & E. Bassett eds. 1977).
25. Id. Proteins produced in the intestine would not have passed through the
protective digestive processes of the stomach and thus could pose more of a threat to
the human body. Most proteins would not be absorbed through the intestine, but a
specialized active protein such as a growth hormone might be different. At any rate,
our "evolutionary survival as omnivores" has never been tested by the presence in our
lower intestine of an extra pituitary gland, the gland which produces the growth hor-
mone. Id.
26. Id.
27. Grobstein, supra note 1, at 136. Shotgun experiments involve cutting an
organism's total DNA with enzymes and recombining the many fragments with DNA
from a known vector or carrier. The vectors are randomly inserted into E. coli and
each cell containing a particular foreign sequence is colonized. The result is a library
of all the nucleotide sequences of a particular organism. The shotgun experiment is
often used to explore the complex genetic systems of higher organisms. The attendant
risks, however, are of greater magnitude than the more selective method where a par-
ticular gene with a known function is inserted into the bacteria. Certain segments of
the DNA having unknown or repressed functions may replicate and cause unforeseen
dangers. Id.
28. Thomasson, supra note 8, at 33. Presently researchers use a strain of bacte-
ria known as E. coli K-12, which through years of cultivation has become practically
incapable of competing for survival outside the laboratory with the wild strains of E.
coli in the human intestine. Before the K-12 strains die, however, they may transfer
their genetic information to a wild host through the vector containing the foreign
DNA. Id. Even dead bacteria's DNA is transferable to a living bacteria. Loechler,
supra note 23, at 170.
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An additional cause for concern is that most presently
used recombinant DNA plasmids contain antibiotic-resistant
markers.2 Due to the widespread use of antibiotics by the
American public, there is a potential for selective enrichment
of these plasmids8 0 The selective advantage conferred by the
antibiotic-resistant plasmids increases the likelihood that the
bacteria will survive and propagate or that the plasmid will be
transferred."
Fortunately, no hazard has materialized to date and most,
although not all, scientists familiar with the field seem to
think that their original fears were unfounded.2 No matter
how small the risk, the possibility exists that one of the poten-
tial hazards will materialize causing death or serious injury to
the unfortunate victim. Unlike other unforeseen effects from
experimental medicines like thalidomide or chemicals like
Agent Orange that can be withdrawn from the market as soon
as the dangers are known, the new forms of life are self-
perpetuating."3
D. Regulations
Since researchers had recognized the risk of their new
techniques, in 1974 they voluntarily imposed a moratorium on
certain of the more dangerous recombinant DNA experiments
until the risks could be evaluated.8 ' The National Institutes of
Health (NIA) established a committee to investigate the
hazards involved and in 1976 issued Guidelines for Research
of Recombinant DNA Molecules (NIH Guidelines)." The
29. Loechler, supra note 23, at 170. Certain E. coli contain antibiotic-resistant
plasmids. These plasmids are particularly good vectors for introducing foreign DNA
into bacteria. A foreign DNA fragment is inserted into the antibiotic resistant plas-
mid and the plasmid is inserted into bacteria. The bacteria which has acquired the
desired foreign DNA can be selected from the other bacteria because it will be the
only surviving bacteria in the presence of the antibiotic. Antibiotic-resistant plasmids
are invaluable in recombinant DNA research because they enable the researcher to
separate the desired hybrid bacteria from the others by means of selective survival
using antibiotics. Cohen, supra note 3, at 27-28.
30. Loechler, supra note 23, at 170.
31. See Richmond, supra note 8, at 440; Lederberg, supra note 24, at 488.
32. Schmeck, supra note 17, at 41. Concern still exists, however, over the safety
of large scale industrial operations. Id.
33. Genetics and the Profit Motive, 143 AMERICA 301 (1980).
34. Loechler, supra note 23, at 166-67.
35. Id. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976). See generally Jacobs, The Role of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health in Rulemaking, in RECOMBINANT MOLECULES: IMPACT ON
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1976 NIH Guidelines banned certain experiments with an ex-
tremely high potential for hazardous consequences.3 The
Guidelines also imposed varying levels of physical and biologi-
cal containment on DNA research depending upon the magni-
tude of risk.
Physical containment involves the use of standard
microbiology laboratory practices, containment equipment,
and special laboratory design to confine the organisms con-
taining recombinant DNA molecules.3 7 Physical containment
is an attempt "to reduce the potential for exposure of the lab-
oratory worker, persons outside of the laboratory, and the en-
vironment to organisms containing recombinant DNA
molecules."38
Biological containment focuses on the vector (plasmid or
virus) for the recombinant DNA and the host (bacterial,
plant, or animal cell) in which the vector is propagated. 9 The
"combination of vector and host . . . must be chosen or con-
structed so that the following types of escape are minimized:
(i) survival of the vector in its host outside the laboratory and
(ii) transmission of the vector from the propagation host to
other nonlaboratory hosts.' '40
The present state of regulation in recombinant DNA re-
search poses several problems. The major problem is that the
NIH Guidelines apply only to government funded research,
and the sanction for violating them is merely the withdrawal
of funding. "1 Private industry is not required to comply with
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 445 (R. Beers & E. Bassett eds. 1977).
36. These experiments included: those characterized by formation of recombi-
nants containing the genes for potent toxins; those involving transfer of a drug resis-
tant trait to microorganisms not known to acquire it naturally; those involving recom-
binant DNA bacteria cultures exceeding ten liters in size. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,107 (1976).
"We differentiate between small- and large-scale experiments with organisms con-
taining recombinant DNAs because the probability of escape from containment barri-
ers normally increases with increasing scale." Id. at 60,108. In addition, the NIH
Guidelines presently inhibit development of bacteria with useful environmental func-
tions by prohibiting the release into the environment of organisms containing recom-
binant DNA molecules. Id. at 33,107. On the other hand, "the RAC [Recombinant
Advisory Committee, a government committee responsible for the safety of recombi-
nant DNA research and activities] may make exceptions for particular experiments
deemed to be of direct societal benefit, if appropriate equipment is used." Id.
37. Id. at 60,109.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 60,113.
40. Id.
41. Wright, Recombinant DNA Policy: Controlling Large-Scale Processing, EN-
19821
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the Guidelines at all.2 Private industry has voluntarily agreed
to comply,4 s but at present no government agency is oversee-
ing the safety of recombinant DNA activities in the private
sector.""
The Guidelines also restrict the size of the recombinant
DNA bacteria culture to a maximum of ten liters."' Much
larger cultures, however, are necessary for commercial produc-
tion.'" In order to increase the levels of production, requests
to make larger cultures must be granted by the Recombinant
DNA Advisory Committee (the RAC).17 Presently, two com-
panies have been granted exemption from the strict ten liter
limits."s The problem, however, is that there are presently no
NIH Guidelines for large scale work.' 9 The large scale use of
recombinant DNA bacteria increases the magnitude of risk
and stricter containment requirements seem to be necessary. 0
The RAC has recently begun to develop containment proce-
dures for the larger scale cultures.8
1
Congress has been actively involved in trying to pass bills
extending the Guidelines to industry and providing for
stronger sanctions in the event the regulations are violated. 2
Such attempts at legislation have thus far been thwarted by
the biomedical community lobbying concerns.58 In fact, pres-
sure from the many involved in recombinant DNA research
has resulted in a major relaxation in the NIH Guidelines."
VIRONMENT, Sept. 1980, at 29.
42. Id.
43. Schmeck, supra note 17, at 41.
44. Wright, supra note 41, at 32.
45. Id. at 30.
46. Id.
47. Id. See note 36 supra.
48. Schmeck, supra note 17, at 41. Genentech, Inc., the South San Francisco
research firm, has received exemption from the ten liter limit to produce insulin and
somatostatin, a brain hormone. Eli Lilly and Co. has also received exemption from
the ten liter restriction for producing components of insulin. Id.
49. Wright, supra note 41, at 30.
50. See id. at 32; Schmeck, supra note 17, at 41.
51. Wright, supra note 41, at 31.
52. See generally Hearings on Genetic Engineering Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); Hearings on the Recombinant DNA Regulating Act of 1977 Before the Sub-
comm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The proposed regulation bill
included a provision for strict IiAbility in the event of a DNA research accident.
53. Wright, supra note 41, at 29.
54. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,108 (1978). See Wade, Major Relaxation in DNA Rules, 205
[Vol. 22
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The relaxation in the NIH Guidelines indicates a chang-
ing attitude toward the dangers involved in recombinant DNA
research. 65 Concern has developed that the changing attitude
is attributable to the commercial activities of industrial firms,
many of which expect to begin production and marketing of
bacterial-produced drugs and hormones in a few years." The
profits of such firms will be greatly affected by the safety pre-
cautions required in production, and thus these industrial
firms may be pushing for less restrictions on their work.
Much of the pressure to relax the Guidelines and to avoid
legislation, however, was from the academic sector.' 8 Many of
these scientists now have financial ties to the new industrial
firms active in the field. 9 As a result of the academic scien-
tists' involvement with these profit motivated companies,
their judgment as to the safety of the new technology may be
tainted.
SCIENCE 1238 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Major Relaxation in DNA Rules];
Wade, New Rulebook for Gene Splicer Faces One More Test, 201 SCIENCE 600 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Wade, New Rulebook]. The new NIH Guidelines exempt all ex-
periments in which E. coli K-12 is the host for recombinant DNA molecules, thereby
exempting about 80 to 85 per cent of those experiments covered by the previous
Guidelines. Wade, Major Relaxation in DNA Rules, supra. The exemption, in effect,
allows all such experiments to be carried out at the lowest level of physical contain-
ment which involves merely standard microbiology laboratory practices. Id. The new
Guidelines also reduce the required containment levels used for most shotgun experi-
ments and experiments using a virus as a vector. Wade, New Rulebook, supra, at 601.
Further, the new Guidelines permit private industry to register its recombinant DNA
experiments with the NIH provided the NIH Guidelines are followed. Id.




59. Id. For example, Herbert Boyer is a University of California professor, a
pioneer in recombinant DNA, and vice-president at Genentech, Inc. His $12,500 in-
vestment is now worth about $50 million following the company's stock offering. The
Potential of Gene Splicing, supra note 13, at 89. Ten scientists from molecular biol-
ogy departments at seven European universities and three American universities have
joined the Biogen scientific board. Each was offered a three per cent block of stock
now valued at $1.5 million. Bylinsky, DNA Can Build Companies, Too, FORTUNE,
June 16, 1980, at 145, 149. Cetus Corp. was founded by Ronald Cape, a microbiolo-
gist, Peter Farley, a doctor, and 1960 Nobel prize winner Donald Glaser, a University
of California physicist and molecular biologist. Cetus' scientific board includes two
Nobel prize winners, Joshua Lederberg, a pioneer in molecular biology, and Francis
Crick, who, with James Watson, deciphered the structure of the DNA molecule.
These two, however, own only a small fraction of the company's stock and are not
actively involved in research. Id. at 149.
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E. Commercial Exploitation
While the first products of recombinant DNA technology
may still be a year away from the market, the prospect has
helped engender a multi-million dollar industry, making mil-
lionaires of the scientists and entrepreneurs who founded the
companies.6 0 Most of the commercial developments known to
the public have been made by four small companies: Cetus
Corp., in Berkeley, California; Genentech, Inc., in South San
Francisco; Genex Corp., in Bethesda, Maryland; and Biogen,
S.A., in Geneva, Switzerland."
The large pharmaceutical companies are joining the
movement either by buying stock in the four small specialist
companies or by starting in-house recombinant DNA research.
The companies involved are Eli Lilly, Upjohn, Pfizer, G.D.
Searle, Merck, and Hoffman-La Roche. 2 The oil and chemical
companies have also shown an interest in the new technology
by buying stock in the four specialist companies.6
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that new living organisms created by man are patenta-
ble.64 While awaiting the results of the decision, over one hun-
60. Shiels, Dentzer & Abramson, How Molecular Biology is Spawning an In-
dustry, NEWSWEEK, March 17, 1980, at 70; Wade, Recombinant DNA: Warming up
for Big Payoff, 206 SCIENcE 663 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Warming up for
Big Payoff]. See also Bylinsky, supra note 59, at 144. "J. Leslie Glick, president of
Genex, predicts sales of products in fifteen industries will total $40 billion world-wide
by the year 2000. And $25 billion of that will be by substituting bacteria to make
products now manufactured by the petrochemical industry." The Potential of Gene
Splicing, supra note 13, at 89. See also note 59 supra.
61. Wade, Warming up for Big Payoff, supra note 60, at 663, 665.
62. Id. at 665.
63. Id.
[I]n the week after the Genentech offering, Dow, Monsanto, Inco, and
Schering-Plough [increased their stock holdings] . . . by more than $30
million.. . . Lubrizon Corp. bought into Genentech for $10 million buy-
ing out an interest that Inco Ltd. [had] purchased four years earlier for
$400,000. Shell Oil committed $40 million to a project with Cetus Corp.
of Berkeley, Calif., to develop interferon. In addition, Cetus also has a
$100 million joint program to develop an alcohol fermentation plant
with National Distillers & Chemical, which with Standard Oil Co. of
California and Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) are the company's principal
backers. And Koppers Co. increased its share of Genex Corp., a [Bethes-
da] (Md.) company that is also backed by Monsanto and Emerson Elec-
tric Co., to 45% from 30%.
The Potential of Gene Splicing, supra note 13, at 89.
64. New Life Forms, supra note 13, at 34 (discussing Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980)).
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dred patents involving new life forms were pending in the
Patent Office. 65 The patent protection now available to the
new industry and the venture capital pouring in from large
oil, chemical, and pharmaceutical companies have helped to
stimulate the commercial exploitation of the recombinant
DNA technology. 6
II. STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY
Due to the seemingly endless potential applications for
recombinant DNA and the tremendous potential for financial
gain, many more enterprises are likely to join the movement.
As the number of enterprises involved in the use of recombi-
nant bacteria increases, more large-scale industrial cultures
will be used and the probability rises that a hazardous conse-
quence will follow. If a recombinant bacterium escapes from
the laboratory by infecting a worker, or by some other means,
colonizes in the intestine of that worker or a member of the
public, and produces large quantities of an unneeded sub-
stance, that person may be faced with serious injury or
death.67 After escaping into the environment, if the bacterium
becomes pathogenic, it creates a threat of an epidemic.
The question this comment addresses is what legal re-
course the injured person should have against the manufac-
turer of the bacteria. In the absence of negligence on the part
of the manufacturer, or in light of the difficulty in proving
negligence, strict product liability may be the only legal doc-
trine capable of fixing liability and compensating the injured
victim. This comment discusses the underlying social policies
of strict product liability and whether they justify applying
the doctrine to the recombinant DNA industry. Furthermore,
this comment indicates problems in the strict product liability
analysis presently applied by the courts and presents argu-
ments for modifying the analysis so that strict liability, as an
alternative to negligence, can be available to a person injured
by the living biological product of the recombinant DNA
industry.
65. New Life Forms, supra note 13, at 34.
66. The Potential of Gene Splicing, supra note 13, at 89.
67. See note 25 supra.
1982]
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A. Social Policy-Justifications for Applying Strict Product
Liability
When applying an existing legal principle to a new con-
text, the social goals and values of the principle should first be
examined."8 Justice Traynor, in his concurrence in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,"' was one of the first to rec-
ognize the important policy reasons for imposing liability on
the manufacturer of a product without regard to negligence:
Even if there is no negligence ... public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effec-
tively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
defective products that reach the market. It is evident
that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and
guard against the recurrence of others, as the public can-
not. Those who suffer injury from defective products are
unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an in-
jury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelm-
ing misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing busi-
ness. It is to the public interest to discourage the market-
ing of products having defects that are a menace to the
public. If such products nevertheless find their way into
the market it is to the public interest to place the respon-
sibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the man-
ufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufac-
ture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the
market. However intermittently such injuries may occur
and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of
their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one.
Against such a risk there should be general and constant
protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford
such protection.70
In the recombinant DNA situation, the company who cre-
ates the particular organism with the ability, for example, to
produce insulin, will be considered the manufacturer of the
68. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 681, 685, 688 (1980).
69. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J. concurring). The
plaintiff, a waitress, was injured when a soda bottle exploded in her hand. The court
held that the plaintiff could properly rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in her
negligence action.
70. Id.. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
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product-organism. 71 The manufacturer may choose to grow
the culture and market the bacterial-produced insulin to the
public itself. In the alternative, after obtaining a patent on
the particular organism, the manufacturer may sell or li-
cense 72 a culture of the bacteria to several drug companies,
who will be considered the consumers of the product-organ-
ism. The drug companies will grow the culture and use the
bacteria to produce mass quantities of insulin, which will then
be marketed to the public to be used by those suffering from
diabetes. The public will be the consumer of the insulin
whereas the drug company will be considered the consumer of
the bacteria.3 The persons likely to be injured are the labora-
tory workers employed to work with the culture by the drug
company or the manufacturer or a member of the general
public who becomes infected with the bacteria through con-
tact with the laboratory worker.
1. Risk Control
The first policy argument for strict liability asserted in
Escola, known as risk control, 4 is that responsibility for the
injury must be fixed where it will most effectively reduce the
hazards inherent in the product that has reached the mar-
ket.75 The question is whether the manufacturer of the organ-
ism can be more effective than the worker or the public in
reducing the hazard inherent in the product-organism.
The argument frequently advanced is that the manufac-
turer is in a better position than the public or consumer to
anticipate the potential hazards of risks in a product, "to de-
termine the acceptable levels or risk, and to confine the risks
within these limits. ''7 e Being better able to assess and control
the risks, the manufacturer is also better able to reduce the
risks inherent in a technologically complex product like the
hybrid bacteria that produces insulin.
71. Whether the product-organism can he considered a defective product is dis-
cussed at notes 17-23 and accompanying text infra.
72. Licensing of a patented product allows the licensee to use that product or
produce it in return for a royalty.
73. For a discussion of the drug company as the consumer, see notes 105-06 and
accompanying text infra.
74. Owen, supra note 68, at 711.
75. 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
76. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 809-10 (1976). See
also Owen, supra note 68, at 684-85.
1982]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Not only is the product-organism complex, but the manu-
facturer is knowledgeable in the recombinant DNA technology
and has performed extensive experimentation, testing, and re-
search prior to marketing the product. As a result, the manu-
facturer is more capable of assessing the risks involved in his
product-organism 'and confining them to an acceptable level.
At least the manufacturer has more control over the risk than
the drug company who purchased it, the laboratory worker
who oversees its function, or the general public who knows
nothing about it. Therefore, if someone is injured by the bac-
teria, compelling social policy demands that the manufacturer
who had control of the risk be held strictly liable.
2. Compensation and Spreading the Loss
The second policy argument given in Escola for imposing
strict liability on the manufacturer is that the cost of injury
may be an overwhelming misfortune to the injured individual,
whereas the manufacturer is in a better position to absorb
such costs." The manufacturer can insure against the risk of
injury and spread the cost of compensating the defenseless
victims throughout the public by increasing the price of the
product.78 The cost of injury is fairly placed on the manufac-
turers as a cost of doing business because it forces them to
"pay their way" in the society from which they profit."
The same analysis should apply to the manufacturers of
the bacteria. They can better assess the risks of recombinant
DNA and thus can insure against them. The costs of insur-
ance and risk evaluation can be included in the price of the
bacteria, thus spreading the cost of compensating the injured
77. 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. See also Montgomery & Owen, supra
note 76; Owen, supra note 68.
78. 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d
319, 328 (Alaska 1970); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 368-69, 372
A.2d 736, 739 (1977); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391
(1977). See also Price v. Shell Oil, 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 725-26, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 178, 181-82 (1970); Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Liability:
Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1040 (1980).
("By helping to spread the costs of defect-related accidents among those who con-
sume products, strict liability performs the social insurance function of reducing the
dislocation costs of those accidents."); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 76; Owen,
supra note 68; Comment, A California Perspective on Strict Products Liability, 9
PAC. L.J. 775, 800 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Calif. Perspective].
79. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 76, at 809-10. See also Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965); Bainter v. Lamoine L.P.
Gas Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916, 321 N.E.2d 744, 745 (1974) (quoting Suvada); Hen-
derson, supra note 78, at 1039.
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individual among the drug companies who purchase the bac-
teria and the public who purchases the insulin. The potential
profits in the new industry will be tremendously high, making
it even more compelling to impose the cost on those who
profit from the product which caused the injury.
3. Responsibility for One's Actions
Another policy argument for strict liability recognized in
Escola is that placing the responsibility for an injury caused
by a defective product on the manufacturer who is responsible
for its reaching the market is in the public interest.6 0 "[Als a
matter of policy he who engages in the activity that causes
harm should compensate those harmed."'81 If a manufacturer
chooses to profit by utilizing the potentially hazardous recom-
binant DNA techniques, he should be prepared to compensate
any individual who is harmed by the created product.
4. Burdens of Proving Negligence
The difficulty of proving negligence is often a policy rea-
son given by the courts for imposing strict liability.82 Often an
injury from a product is attributable to negligence on the part
of the manufacturer, but the difficulties encountered by the
plaintiff in proving negligence are insurmountable." If the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor"4 is not available to the plaintiff,
the courts may, as a matter of policy, hold the manufacturer
strictly liable for an injury due to a risk inherent in its
product."'
80. 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) ("The
purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.").
81. Comment, A Calif. Perspective, supra note 78, at 788-98.
82. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). See, e.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942(3d Cir. 1968); Walla v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 618, 619 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (quot-
ing La Rossa); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 (1977).
83. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 76, at 809-10; Owen, supra note 68, at
684-85.
84. Courts occasionally invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor which requires
no further proof of negligence than the occurrence of the incident.
85. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at
440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Henderson, supra note 78, at 1040 ("Al-
though negligence law theoretically forces suppliers of products and services to
achieve socially optimal defect rates, in practice these suppliers escape a portion of
negligence-based liability due to the problems of proof encountered by plaintiffs;
strict liability forces these more efficient cost minimizers to come closer to optimal
1982]
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If a laboratory worker is injured by the bacteria, proving
where he came into contact with bacteria may not be difficult,
but proving whether the NIH Guidelines were followed with
reasonable care may be difficult. If a member of the public is
injured, negligence may become virtually impossible to prove
because of the difficulty of ascertaining where the bacteria
came from. The bacteria could pass through many hosts
before reaching the victim in question.
5. Reliance, Expectation, and Protection
Other policy reasons are based on consumer reliance, ex-
pectation, and protection."0 Consumers expect a product to be
safe for use 87 and rely upon the "skill and expertise of the
manufacturing community" for adequate protection, therefore
they should be allowed to recover when that protection is not
provided. 8 Due to the increasing complexity of products on
the market, the consumer no longer has the ability to ade-
quately protect himself even if he desires to do so.89 There-
fore, the concern is for protection of the powerless or helpless
consumer.90 In the recombinant DNA scenario, the injured
person is not likely to be the consumer-drug company, but is
more likely to be the laboratory worker, as the user of the
product,9 or a member of the general public, as an innocent
defect rates.").
86. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 76, at 809-10.
87. "[Ilmplicit in [a product's] presence on the market... [is] a representation
that it will safely do the job for which it was built." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
88. Montgomery & Owen, supra iote 76, at 809-10; Owen, supra note 68, at
684-85. See Henderson, supra note 78, at 1039.
89. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 236 (1978) ("In many situations ... the consumer would not know what to
expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.") (citing
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829
(1973)). See also Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30, 37 (1973) (criticizing the 402A consumer expectation test: "[T]he ordinary
consumer cannot be said to have expectations as to safety regarding many features of
the complexly made products that are purchased.").
90. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963). See note 80 supra; Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978). In the words of the Barker
court, the decisions now "are more concerned with [the] safety of the individual who
suffers the loss." Id. See Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944). ("Against [the risk inherent in
the product] there should be a general and constant protection and the manufacturer
is best situated to afford such protection.").
91. See user analysis at note 107 and accompanying text infra.
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bystander.2
The laboratory worker will expect the bacteria to be safe
and will expect the containment measures suggested either by
the manufacturer or by the NIH Guidelines to be adequate.
The worker should be able to rely on the expertise and knowl-
edge of the manufacturer as to the safety of using the bacteria
for its intended function. If he had not relied on the manufac-
turer's implied representation as to the safety of the bacteria,
he may not have taken a job where he would risk exposure to
the bacteria. Furthermore, due to the complexity of the bacte-
ria and its ability to self-perpetuate, the laboratory worker is
powerless to protect himself from injury if the bacteria does
escape. Since the laboratory worker expects to be safe and re-
lies on the manufacturer for adequate protection, he should
be allowed to recover from the manufacturer when that pro-
tection is not adequate.
As for the injured member of the public, an even greater
reason exists for holding the manufacturer strictly liable. The
general public may not know that mysterious bacteria are be-
ing used to make drugs in the drug company's laboratories,
and therefore could not have relied on or expected anything.
Thus, the reliance and expectation policies may not apply.
The person most powerless to protect himself, however, is the
member of the public who has come into contact with the bac-
teria without consenting to it or even knowing of its existence.
Only the manufacturer can provide adequate protection in
this situation, and he should be held strictly liable if the pro-
tection it offers is not adequate.
6. Deterrence
An injured individual must be compensated for the cost
of an injury and the loss of time or health after an injury oc-
curs.93 Potential victims, however, should be protected from
the possiblity of future harm.' 4 Courts, in an attempt to pro-
vide this type of future protection, have introduced deterrence
as a policy reason for imposing strict liability.'
92. See innocent bystander analysis at notes 108-16 and accompanying text
infra.
93. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Comment, A Calif. Perspective, supra note 78, at
799-800.
94. Comment, A Calif. Perspective, supra note 78, at 799-800.
95. Id.
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If the manufacturer is held strictly liable for defective
product-caused injuries, he will have more incentive to pro-
vide safe products to the public96 or will be deterred from in-
troducing unsafe or defective products into the market. Im-
posing strict liability on the manufacturer of bacteria may
induce him to design a safer bacteria in the future, thus pro-
viding greater protection for potential victims of the escaped
bacteria. For example, the threat of strict liability may cause
the manufacturer to exercise more care by developing a host
bacteria that does not normally inhabit areas in the human
body.
7. Summary
The traditional policy arguments for imposing strict lia-
bility on a manufacturer justify extending strict liability into
the developing recombinant DNA industry. The manufacturer
of living recombinant DNA bacteria is not significantly differ-
ent from the manufacturer of an industrial machine. Both are
motivated by profit and are able to spread the costs of injury
throughout society as a cost of doing business, and both are in
control of the risk and are responsible for the product reach-
ing the market. If strict liability serves a deterrent purpose, it
will deter them both from marketing unsafe products. The in-
jured individual in both cases is likely to rely on the manufac-
turer's expertise and will be powerless to protect himself.
If there is any obstacle to imposing strict liability on the
manufacturer of recombinant bacteria, it is not in the policy
justifications, but in the strict product liability analysis pres-
ently applied by the courts. Identifying the manufacturer and
the potential plaintiffs, determining the meaning of defect,
and the unavoidably unsafe and scientifically unknowable de-
fenses will be the greatest obstacles to applying strict product
liability in the era of recombinant DNA industry.
96. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 140-41;
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 747, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 838, 844 (1976). The problem with the deterrence or incentive theory of strict
liability is that it clings to the concept of foreseeability. If strict liability is to impose
liability without fault then notions of foreseeability and reasonableness must be
abandoned along with deterrence as a primary goal of strict liability. See generally
McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through the
Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1,
25-28 (1978); Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products Liability: The
Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 101 (1976).
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B. Strict Product Liability Analysis
1. Scope of Liability-Proper Defendants
From the inception of the strict product liability doctrine,
the manufacturer has been held liable for an injury caused by
his defective product. The standard was originally set forth in
the California case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. :97
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used with-
out inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being."8
Under the Greenman rule, the plaintiff must prove that
his injury was caused by the particular bacteria and that the
manufacturer is responsible for putting that particular defec-
tive bacteria on the market." If the injured individual is a
laboratory worker at a drug company who uses certain bacte-
ria to produce insulin, it will not be extremely difficult to
trace the bacteria back to the manufacturer since the drug
company should have records of which manufacturer sold
them the bacteria.
If the injured individual, however, is a member of the
general public who inadvertently came into contact with the
bacteria via a laboratory worker, it may be impossible to trace
the bacteria back to the particular manufacturer. Only if the
injured individual knew that he had come into contact with a
laboratory worker and if the laboratory worker was also in-
fected or injured by the same type of bacteria, could the bac-
teria be traced back to the manufacturer through the drug
company's records. If the injured individual came into contact
with the bacteria through a stranger who happened to be a
laboratory worker or through some other unknown means, it
could be impossible to trace the bacteria to the particular
manufacturer. Obviously, the problem is only present when
97. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
98. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
99. In McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730(1978), plaintiff brought a product liability action against Eli Lilly, alleging that her
cervical cancer was attributable to her mother's use of DES during pregnancy. The
court held that plaintiff could not maintain a products liability action against Eli
Lilly where she was not able to identify the specific manufacturer of the DES taken
by her mother. There were at least 142 manufacturers of the drug at the time her
mother was taking it.
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there is more than one manufacturer of the bacteria.'
The California Supreme Court dealt with this problem of
identifying the manufacturer in Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries.' ' The plaintiffs were women who had developed cervical
cancer as a result of their mothers' use of DES, a miscarriage-
prevention drug, during pregnancy. In many cases, the daugh-
ters were unable to prove which manufacturer's drug was
taken by their mothers. The supreme court held that when
"the manufacturer of the DES which caused plaintiff's inju-
ries cannot be identified" and "all defendants produced a
drug from an identical formula," any defendant who produced
a substantial share of the DES on the market "will be held
liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its
share of that market."'' 0 If the manufacturer demonstrates
that he could not have made the product which caused the
plaintiff's injuries, he will not be held liable.
In the case of an injury caused by a recombinant bacteria,
where the bacteria cannot be traced back to a specific manu-
facturer, the California courts will probably follow the holding
in Sindell. The court's position in Sindell, however, is a
marked departure from previous strict liability cases and
whether other jurisdictions will follow California's lead is un-
clear. Thus, in other jurisdictions, the plaintiff's inability to
identify the specific manufacturer of the bacteria could result
100. If the bacteria is patented and the patent holder gives an exclusive license
to a company to manufacture the bacteria, that company would be the only manufac-
turer. In many cases, however, the patent holder will be a company, such as
Genentech, that will itself manufacture the bacteria as well as license others to do the
same. Thus, several companies would manufacture the same bacteria, and to ascer-
tain where the bacteria which caused the injury was made would be almost impossi-
ble. Unlike a drug, the bacteria cannot be stamped with the manufacturer's name.
101. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
102. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
Many other such cases are pending throughout the country. In those that have
been decided, the courts have held in favor of the defendant drug companies because
of the plaintiff's inability to identify the manufacturer of the DES taken by their
mothers. Id. at 597, 607 P.2d at 927-28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36. See Gray v. United
States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (where defendants' briefs refer to a number
of cases in which actions have been dismissed for failure to identify the particular
DES manufacturer); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 82-83, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 730, 733-36 (1978).
Two cases have held for the plaintiff, notwithstanding her inability to identify a
specific manufacturer of DES. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979)
(appeal pending); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 60497 (Mich. Ct. App. filed 1979) (on
appeal to Supreme Court of Michigan).
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in the denial of recovery.
The doctrine of strict liability not only imposes liability
on the manufacturer of the product, but it has been extended
to impose liability on retailers and distributors.10 3 In essence,
the scope of liability extends to any party who causes the
product to enter the stream of commerce or any party in the
chain of distribution. Some courts also impose strict liability
on a commercial lessor of a defective product. 04
A manufacturer who holds a patent on a bacteria and en-
ters license agreements with companies who wish to use the
bacteria to produce insulin, should not escape liability. A pat-
ent licensing arrangement is similar to a leasing agreement:
the companies pay the manufacturer royalties for the right to
use the bacteria culture just as a company would rent rather
than purchase an industrial machine. Thus, the manufacturer
who licenses his patented bacteria should be strictly liable as
a commercial lessor.
2. Protected Parties-Proper Plaintiffs
a. Consumers and Users. Once the proper defendants
have been ascertained, the courts must determine who is pro-
tected by the strict liability doctrine. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts expressly protects the injured consumer and ul-
timate user, but expresses no opinion as to whether other
injured persons should be protected.10 5
103. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-
72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964). The retailer is an "integral part of the overall
producing and marketing enterprise" and is therefore "strictly liable ... for personal
injuries caused by defects in . . . [products] sold by it." Id.
104. See Price v. Shell Oil, 2 Cal. 3d 245, 253, 466 P.2d 722, 727, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178, 183 (1970) ("[N]o significant difference [is apparent] between a manufacturer or
retailer who places an article on the market by means of a sale and a bailor or lessor
who accomplishes the same result by means of a lease.").
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
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In the recombinant DNA industry, the consumer will be
the drug company which purchases the insulin-producing bac-
teria from the manufacturer. Although normally a consumer is
thought to be a member of the general public who consumes
products on the market, "[c]onsumption includes all ultimate
uses for which the product is intended."10 The bacteria is ul-
timately intended to be used by the drug company to produce
insulin or other drugs to be marketed to the general public.
Thus, the drug company is the consumer of the bacteria and
the public is the consumer of the products produced by the
bacteria. The drug company which purchases a bacteria cul-
ture to produce insulin is analogous to a shoe manufacturer
who purchases a shoe-making machine to make shoes. Both
are consuming products at the industrial level in order to pro-
vide other products for consumption by the public.
An employee who operates a machine purchased by his
employer is allowed recovery from the manufacturer in strict
liability because he is a "user" of the product.10 7 The labora-
tory worker at the drug company who is injured by coming
into contact with the bacteria should be allowed recovery in
strict liability because he is also a "user."Y
Although the laboratory worker does not operate the bac-
teria in the same sense that a worker may operate a mechani-
cal machine, the bacteria cannot perform its function without
his assistance. The laboratory worker may need to provide nu-
trients, extract insulin from the vats where the culture is
growing, monitor containment procedures, and inspect con-
tainment apparatus to insure compliance with the NIH
Guidelines. The laboratory worker uses the bacteria to pro-
Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules
stated in this Section may not apply
(1) to harm to persons other than users or consumers;
(2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or otherwise
substantially changed before it reaches the user or consumer; or
(3) to the seller of a component part of a product to be assembled.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment 1 at 354 (1965).
107. Id. See also Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978) (The plaintiff-employee was injured at work when a high-lift loader
he was operating overturned. The manufacturer was held strictly liable.); Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978) (reversed on other grounds)
(Plaintiff-employee was injured while operating a "pelletizing" machine and defen-
dant-manufacturer was held strictly liable.); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J.
413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972) (Plaintiff-employee was injured at work while operating a
power punch press manufactured by defendant. Defendant was held strictly liable.).
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duce insulin just as, for example, one would use a machine to
produce shoes. As technology changes, the nature of products
change, i.e., mechanical machines are replaced with biological
machines, and the law should be flexible in order to meet
those changes.
b. Innocent Bystanders. If the bacteria manages to es-
cape containment either by infecting the laboratory worker or
through ventilation passages or some other means, and infects
a member of the general public, strict liability may still be
imposed under the innocent bystander theory. In Elmore v.
American Motors Corp.,108 the California Supreme Court held
that bystanders were entitled to the same, if not greater, strict
liability protection as the consumers or users:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater pro-
tection than the consumer or user where injury to by-
standers from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Con-
sumers and users at least have the opportunity to inspect
for defects and to limit their purchases to articles manu-
factured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputa-
ble retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has no
such opportunities. In short, the bystander is in greater
need of protection from defective products which are
dangerous, and if any distinction should be made between
bystanders and users, it should be made . . . to extend
greater liability in favor of the bystanders.109
Although the court found an even greater need for protecting
the bystander than the user, it limited recovery to a bystander
whose injury is reasonably foreseeable.
Traditionally, a bystander was a person standing nearby
or in the vicinity at the time of an accident. For example, in
the automobile collision cases,110 the "bystander" allowed re-
108. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (Plaintiffs were the
driver of the car with a defective drive shaft and the occupants of the car with which
it collided. The court stated that the defect created a hazard not only to the driver
and passenger of the car but to pedestrians and other drivers as well.). See also
Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968); Giberson v. Ford Motor
Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Howes v.
Hanson, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
109. 70 Cal. 2d at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657 (emphasis added).
110. See Carruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83 (1970); Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969);
Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971); Codling v. Paglia, 32
N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
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covery is usually a nearby pedestrian or an occupant of the
car hit by the defective car. The court in Elmore suggested
that the manufacturer's duty extends to the bystander when
his injury is a "foreseeable risk," ' and often foreseeability of
injury is determined by the bystander's proximity to the scene
of the accident.
In the recombinant DNA scenario, proximity to the scene
of the accident does not necessarily determine the foreseeable
risk of injury to an individual. A member of the general public
is not nearby at the time of the bacteria's escape, yet the risk
of injury to him is reasonably foreseeable due to the manner
in which bacterial injury occurs." 2 Once the bacteria infects
111. 70 Cal. 2d at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
112. See Loechler, supra note 23, at 171.
The bacterium harboring the recombinant DNA might not cause disease
until it has passed through several hosts. Furthermore, a disease-causing
bacterium may be difficult to trace from the laboratory or to recognize
initially. Special hosts or environments inside or outside the laboratory,
such as a person under antibiotic treatment, might allow the recombi-
nant DNA and its host to flourish locally. The ways in which E. coli can
disseminate and infect humans may surprise the builders of physical
containment facilities. A recent study speculated that E. coli could be
transferred by air from chickens to humans in much smaller quantities
than is possible by ingestion, which usually required 100 to 10 orga-
nisms. Another recent report on the spread of diarrhea-causing E. coli
between infants in a special-care nursery suggested that the bacterium
was transferred from patient to patient by the hands of hospital person-
nel. Under the right conditions, only very low doses of E. coli must be
ingested for infections to ensue.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977), where the mother of the
child vaccinated with the Sabin vaccine (live virus vaccine) contracted polio from
close contact with her child. The court held the manufacturer of the vaccine strictly
liable due to inadequate warnings. Although the 'court did not address the issue in
this case, the vaccinated child is the user and the mother is the bystander. Possibly
the mother would be considered a more foreseeable victim than the general public,
injured by recombinant bacteria, but not necessarily more foreseeable than fellow em-
ployees of the infected laboratory worker. Although a mother may be expected to
have closer contact with her daughter, fellow workers at the same company are also
often in close contact. They share the same lavatories, eat in the same lunch rooms,
and have other similar contact with each other.
The importance of Givens to the posed situation is that the injury occurs in the
same way. The mother's close contact with the daughter allowed the live virus to
move from one human host to the other. Only the second host, however, was injured.
Injury by recombinant bacteria may occur in the same way. The laboratory worker is
the most likely to become infected with the bacteria, but as he comes into contact
with another worker, a member of his family, or a friend on the street, he allows the
bacteria to transfer from himself to another human host. It is possible that only the
second or even third host may be susceptible to injury.
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the laboratory worker, it can colonize in his intestine and
cause injury to him by producing large quantities of an un-
needed substance such as insulin. Since the bacteria is capable
of being transmitted from one human host to another, the
bacteria could foreseeably be transmitted to a fellow worker,
friends, or family members who will in turn pass it on to
others.
The result is that any member of the general public can
be a foreseeable victim by coming into contact with the bacte-
ria's human host. Therefore, such contact is a "perfectly fore-
seeable risk of the maker's enterprise" 113 and he should be
strictly liable for injuries to the fellow worker as well as the
general public. The injured individual here, like the bystander
in Elmore, is powerless to protect himself and thus is in
greater need of protection than a consumer or user of the
product."'
The New York Court of Appeals in Codling v. Paglial"
allowed recovery to a bystander, and the use of broad lan-
guage in its holding may eliminate some of the problems
posed by the use of the term "bystander": "[u]nder a doctrine
of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a defective
product is liable to any person injured. . . if the defect was a
substantial factor in bringing about his injury. . .. "" ' Since
under Codling any person injured can recover as long as the
defect was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury,
both the laboratory worker and the general public would be
protected if their injury was caused by the bacteria.
3. Defective Product
a. Generally. Under a strict liability theory, it becomes
necessary to define the meaning of "product" and "defect"
and to determine whether the potentially hazardous bacteria
can be considered a "defective" product. To determine
whether the bacteria that has escaped from the laboratory
and caused an injury to an individual is a defective product,
the bacteria must first be considered a product. The cases im-
113. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75
Cal. Rptr. at 657.
114. Id.
115. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973) (Plaintiff, the in-
jured occupant of the automobile hit by the defective automobile, was allowed recov-
ery as a bystander.).
116. Id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70 (emphasis added).
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posing strict liability on the manufacturers of the Sabin polio
vaccine which contains live polio viruses, establish that the
living character of an article does not prevent its classification
as a product.117 Recombinant DNA bacteria, therefore, may be
considered a product.
The Restatement requires that the product be in a "de-
fective condition unreasonably dangerous."' 18 A defect is de-
termined on the basis of consumer expectations of safety,
which is basically a balancing of risks and benefits." ' The
California Supreme Court feared that the "unreasonably dan-
gerous" language was a step backwards into negligence law
and rejected the language in its formulation of the strict lia-
bility doctrine. The court recognized that the "unreasonably
dangerous" language was included in the Restatement to pro-
tect the seller from becoming the absolute insurer of his prod-
uct.120 The court asserted, however, that the "protective end is
attained by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in
the manufacture or design of the product and that such a de-
fect was a proximate cause of the injuries.' ' 2 '
Under the California approach, it is necessary to distin-
guish between manufacturing defects and design defects.22 A
manufacturing defect is one that occurs during the manufac-
turing process.' When a product with a manufacturing de-
fect leaves the manufacturer, it is not in the condition in-
tended by the manufacturer. On the other hand, a design
117. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351 (1965) (A de-
fective condition is one "not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him."). Comment i sheds light on the meaning of unrea-
sonably dangerous: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristic." Id at 352-53.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
120. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
121. Id.
122. For design defects and the Barker test, see notes 27 & 30 and accompany-
ing text infra. For manufacturing defects and the Cronin test, see notes 120-21 and
accompanying text supra. Section 402A of the Restatement makes no distinction be-
tween design defects and manufacturing defects.
123. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 428-29, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 236 (1978).
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defect is an inherent risk in the makeup of the product.2
When a product with a design defect leaves the manufacturer,
it is in the condition intended but that condition is inherently
dangerous.
In the situation involving recombinant bacteria, the bac-
teria will generally be in the condition the manufacturer in-
tended when they are placed on the market, 25 but the chosen
design may be inherently dangerous. For example, the manu-
facturer intended to use E. coli as the host and intended to
introduce a foreign gene for the production of insulin, but if
the E. coli escapes there is a risk that it will colonize in a
human intestine and cause injury. The risk is created by the
use of E. coli as a host, and thus it is a design defect. This
comment will focus on the California approach to the design
defect.
b. Design Defects in Recombinant DNA Bacteria. In
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 2 6 the California Supreme
Court set forth two alternative tests for determining the de-
fectiveness of a design:
A product is defective in design, either (1) if the product
has failed to perform safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner, (or) 2 ... if ... benefits of the chal-
lenged design do not outweigh the risks of danger inher-
ent in such design.127
The court set forth several factors to be considered when
balancing the risks and benefits: the gravity of the danger; the
likelihood of the danger occurring; the feasibility of an alter-
native safer design; the cost of an alternative design; and the
adverse consequences to the product or to the consumer that
may result from an alternative design.1 2 8 The court concluded
that if the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that the prod-
uct proximately caused his injury, the burden would shift to
124. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
125. A few bacteria possibly will mutate during reproduction and thus will be
aberrational when they leave the manufacturer. The bacteria would then have manu-
facturing defects and the Cronin test for defects would be applied rather than the
Barker test. For a discussion of the Cronin test, see notes 120 - 121 and accompany-
ing text supra. A mutation may also occur after the bacteria leave the manufacturer,
but that defect would not be attributable to the manufacturer.
126. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
127. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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the defendant to prove in light of the relevant factors that the
product is not defective." 9
In light of the Barker factors, the risks involved in using
bacteria to produce a substance must be weighed against the
benefits. In view of the bacteria's ability to self-perpetuate
and travel from one human host to another, the gravity of the
danger resulting from the bacteria's escape seems quite high.
The likelihood of the bacteria's escape, on the other hand,
seems slight due to the containment safeguards imposed by
the NIH Guidelines. Lack of experience in the area, however,
indicated that it is possible the suggested containment mea-
sures may not be adequate for large scale industrial uses of
the bacteria.
If a host bacteria other than E. coli, which is not a normal
inhabitant of human beings, were feasible, the design alterna-
tive would eliminate one risk. The cost of designing an alter-
native bacterial host, however, may be prohibitive. The public
may also suffer if the search for an alternative host results in
keeping a desperately needed drug or hormone off the market
indefinitely. If the drug or hormone is presently available, it
may not be available in the quantities needed by the public.
For example, bacteria may be able to produce interferon and
the pituitary growth hormone in large quantities, while pres-
ently both products are scarce and very expensive.
As the recombinant DNA technology matures and the po-
tential products come closer to market, the risk-benefit bal-
ance will become more accurate. If the risks are found to out-
weigh the benefits, the injured individual should recover the
costs of his injury from the manufacturer.
c. Unavoidably Unsafe Products. Before strict liability
will be imposed on the manufacturer, the injured individual
must overcome the obstacle raised by comment k of the Re-
statement.30 Comment k seeks to shield from strict liability
the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe product. ' A
product is unavoidably unsafe when the present state of
129. Id.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353-54 (1965)
states: "The seller of [an unavoidably unsafe product] . . . is not to be held strictly
liable for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended




human knowledge is insufficient to make the product safe for
its intended use.132
Comment k is especially applicable in the field of drugs.
An example of an unavoidably unsafe drug is the rabies vac-
cine. s3 The vaccine can cause harm when administered, but
without it the disease leads to certain death."" Thus, the mar-
keting and the use of the vaccine are fully justified even in
light of the unavoidable high degree of risk involved in using
the vaccine. 35 Comment k also applies to many new or experi-
mental drugs which have no assurance of safety due to lack of
time and insufficient medical experience.' 36 The benefits to
the public, however, may justify the marketing and use of the
drug despite a medically recognizable risk. 3 7
The recombinant DNA bacteria may satisfy the require-
ments of an unavoidably unsafe product, thereby shielding
the manufacturer from strict liability. Since the recombinant
DNA technology is still in an infant stage, whether the recom-
binant bacteria can be made safe for its intended use is not
known. Even if it is not completely safe, the benefits to be
gained may justify the premature marketing of the bacteria.
Before a product is considered unavoidably unsafe, the
product's known risks must be outweighed by the potential
benefits and utility of the product.' Unavoidably unsafe
drugs and vaccines are often lifesaving. Saving many lives
should outweigh the risk of causing injury to a few. The bene-
fits derived from using recombinant bacteria to produce
needed drugs and hormones are great, but those benefits may
only be providing a less expensive or more efficient method
than presently employed. The recombinant bacteria may also
make larger quantities of a scarce drug or hormone available
to the public. If these are the only benefits to be derived from
132. Willig, The Comment k Character: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liabil-
ity, 29 MERCER L. REv. 545, 556 (1978).





138. Id. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chap-
man, 388 N.E.2d 541, 546 (1979) (citing Borel). See Note, The Liability of Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FORDHAM L. REv.
735, 743 (1980).
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using bacteria to produce products, the benefits are unlikely
to outweigh the risk of injury to the public. Thus, the recom-
binant bacteria may not be considered an unavoidably unsafe
product.
d. Scientifically Unknowable Dangers. Unavoidably un-
safe products are those in which the risks are known but can-
not be eliminated, and the benefits of the product justify mar-
keting it despite the known risks. If a product is
manufactured as intended and an individual suffers an un-
foreseeable reaction or is injured by the product in an unfore-
seen manner, the risk is scientifically unknowable. Courts
have held that the manufacturer can only be liable for those
risks known at the time of injury.39 In other words, only
those risks that are known enter the risk-benefit balance in
determining whether the design of the product is defective.
Commentators have suggested that the risks known at the
time of trial should enter the balance as well.4 0
At least one court has allowed recovery for an injury not
reasonably foreseeable in light of the state of medical knowl-
edge at the time of manufacture."" In Crocker v. Winthrop
Laboratories,"2 the plaintiff's decedent became addicted to
defendant's new drug, Talwin, which was thought to be non-
addictive. Although the addictive quality of the drug was sci-
entifically unknown, the plaintiff was allowed to recover be-
cause the defendant's affirmative representations of non-ad-
dictiveness induced the physician to prescribe large amounts
of the drug. The court refused to rule that a manufacturer's
liability can be measured by the risks known at the time of
the trial but stated that "some products, though manufac-
tured as designed and intended, are so dangerous in fact that
the manufacturer should be liable for resulting harm though
he did not know and could not have known of the danger at
the time of marketing."'" 8
The risk of a recombinant bacteria escaping is a known
risk and the risk of an E. coli recombinant bacteria causing
139. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1088; Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 548.
140. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J.
30, 38 (1973).
141. Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 432.
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harm by colonizing in the human intestine is also a known
risk. Therefore, these risks would enter into the risk-benefit
analysis when determining whether the design is defective. On
the other hand, if an unknown or repressed function was in-
serted unintentionally along with the desired gene and caused
the bacteria to become pathogenic, it might be considered a
scientifically unknowable risk. Since the recombinant DNA
technology is still in an early stage, many other scientifically
unperceived risks of even greater magnitude may exist. If an
individual was injured by the bacteria in an unforeseen man-
ner, there may be problems imposing strict liability, especially
since the courts seem to be measuring knowledge of the risks
at the time of injury.
e. Warnings. Where a seller has reason to anticipate the
risk inherent in the product, he may be required to give a
warning. Without that warning the product will be defec-
tive.' 4 In the recombinant DNA context, even a warning of
the danger may not protect those likely to be injured by the
bacteria.
Directions for the safe use of the recombinant DNA bac-
teria and a warning that there is a risk of bacterial escape will
probably reach the laboratory worker. He will be in the posi-
tion to make an informed decision as to whether he wishes to
expose himself to the risks involved. If he chooses to work
with the bacteria and if the containment measures prove to be
inadequate, he cannot protect himself from the risk of infec-
tion upon the bacteria's escape.
A member of the general public is not likely to receive a
warning. If an individual is injured and the manufacturer
could have reasonably foreseen such an injury, the warning
may be considered inadequate if it did not reach the victim. "",
Even if the public does receive warning, they will not be in
the position to protect themselves.
No reasonable degree of care can prevent the escaped
bacteria from infecting members of the public or the labora-
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h at 351-52 (1965).
145. Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Sultan Chemists, Inc., 555 F.2d 1184
(4th Cir. 1977). Failure to warn may render a product defective for an unintended but
foreseeable use. Inmates at a prison drank alcohol intended and sold only as a fuel for
dentists and dental laboratories and as a result became blind. The manufacturer was
held strictly liable because the labeling for the professionals was deemed inadequate
when others might foreseeably have access to it. Id.
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tory workers once they come into contact with the bacteria.
Thus, a warning to the general public or even to the labora-
tory workers would serve no useful purpose and should not be
a determining factor when imposing strict liability on the
manufacturer.
III. CONCLUSION
The recombinant DNA technique, with its endless poten-
tial applications and tremendous potential for profit, is re-
sponsible for the birth of a new multi-million dollar industry.
The rapid commercial exploitation of the technique, however,
increases the likelihood of a hazardous consequence.
The commercial use of bacteria to make products for the
public requires large scale cultures of bacteria. The larger the
culture, the greater the risk that the bacteria will escape. If an
escaped bacteria injures a laboratory worker or a member of
the general public, the courts will need to fashion a legal rem-
edy. Due to the difficulty of proving negligence, the strict
product liability doctrine may be the best available remedy.
The policy reasons for imposing strict liability seem to
justify applying the doctrine to the growing recombinant DNA
industry. The manufacturer of the bacteria is in the best posi-
tion to control the risk, absorb the cost of injury, spread the
loss as a cost of doing business, and protect the defenseless
victim.
Since the policy justifications for imposing strict liability
seem to warrant extending strict liability into the new area,
the obstacles raised by the present conceptual framework of
the doctrine should not foreclose the injured individual's re-
covery. A laboratory worker should be allowed recovery as a
user of the bacteria. A member of the general public should be
allowed recovery under the innocent bystander theory because
his injury is a foreseeable risk in light of the product's ability
to be transmitted from one human host to another.
If the plaintiff is unable to identify the particular manu-
facturer of the bacteria that caused the injury, perhaps the
courts should take the California Supreme Court's approach
in the DES cases and hold that any manufacturer of the spe-
cific product is strictly liable to the extent of his proportion-
ate share of the market.
Determining whether the bacteria's design is defective is
not significantly different than determining the defectiveness
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of any conventional product's design. Either the consumer ex-
pectation test or the risk-benefit balance should be applied.
As for the unavoidably unsafe product and the scientifically
unknowable defenses, the courts should carefully scrutinize
these attempts to shield the manufacturer from strict liability
in view of the strong policy reasons in favor of imposing strict
liability.
Many problems in the strict liability analysis arise be-
cause of the nature of a living, self-perpetuating biological
product. The strict liability doctrine evolved in response to
the need for a remedy when an individual was injured by a
mechanical, chemical, or electrical product. Now there is a
need for a remedy when an individual is injured by a living
biological product. In order to provide that remedy, the pre-
sent strict liability doctrine may need to be modified slightly.
Due to the strong policy reasons for imposing strict liability in
the recombinant DNA situation, the minor obstacles in the
conceptual framework of the doctrine should not be allowed
to foreclose a needed remedy.
Debra E. Dahl
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